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Article 7

The Litigation Explosion, Proposed Reforms, and their
Consequences
A recent study found that America “spends five times as much as its
major industrial competitors on personal-injury wrangling . . . [and] that
over the last two generations the cost of injury litigation rose
fourteenfold after inflation, while the size of the real U.S. economy rose
threefold.”1 Another survey reported, “American tort claims [run] at least
ten times higher [than Britain’s], malpractice claims [are] thirty to forty
times higher, and product claims [are] nearly a hundred times higher, in
each case per capita.”2 These reports, and other studies of a similar
nature, represent substantial evidence of a “litigation explosion” that is
consuming the productivity, profits, and general effectiveness of many
American industries.3 Pointing to such information, a broad coalition of
lawmakers, politicians, scholars, business leaders, and citizens now
petition for substantial reformation of the judicial system.4 This Article
introduces the reforms proposed to reduce litigation.5 Each of the
proposals must be carefully considered, as serious constitutional and
practical problems accompany the benefits associated with each of them.
Section I summarizes evidence establishing the existence of a
litigation explosion and introduces the concept in general terms. Section
II examines the proposal of fee shifting. Section III considers the merits
and consequences of statutorily-imposed caps on damages. Section IV
evaluates the proposal of stricter limitations on the methods and manner
whereby lawyers solicit clients and reviews the legal principles that
already restrict the nature and scope of permissible lawyer advertising.
Section V reviews allegations that frivolous lawsuits impose a substantial
burden on the legal system that can be neatly eliminated by the
imposition of certification of merit requirements. Section VI concludes
1. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA
UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 7 (Truman Talley Books 1991).
2. Id. (citing Patrick S. Atiyah, Tort Law and the Alternatives: Some Anglo-American
Comparisons, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1002, 1012).
3. But see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS,
735 (Aspen 2002) (“As with all other issues in the fight over tort law, the seriousness of the problem
is hotly disputed.”).
4. See infra note 6, and accompanying text.
5. While this paper does not purport to address all of the proposals for reform, it does
attempt to identify and explore those proposals that are most frequently levied.
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by noting that serious constitutional and practical consequences plague
all of the proposals.
I. THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION
The term “litigation explosion” describes the contemporary
perception that litigation is increasingly prevalent in the United States
and burdensome to society. The existence of the litigation explosion and
the significance of its consequences continue to be debated points.
Nevertheless, the litigation explosion has become a battle cry for a broad
array of lawmakers, politicians, scholars, business leaders, and citizens.6
These individuals contend that something must be done to reduce
litigation, which they view as “costly and inefficient.”7 Professor Miller
aptly sets forth their position:
Increased litigation is said to result in substantial costs and delay. One
study of the expenditures in asbestos litigation in the federal court
system found that only thirty-seven cents of each dollar expended by
defendants and insurers went to the victim, with legal fees and other
transaction costs consuming the remainder. Accompanying this rise in
costs seems to be an increase in the length of time that it takes to
adjudicate or otherwise dispose of a dispute. Other problems associated
with the “litigation explosion” are the harassment of innocent
defendants, people not entering the medical profession or leaving
because of the high cost of insurance or the fear of litigation, and,
paradoxically, the denial of effective relief to deserving claimants.8

The debate about the litigation explosion may be tainted, to some
degree, by exaggerations and overstatements.9 However, examining the
issue is important because evidence of its existence is accumulating and
because the litigation explosion debate has attained a level of substantial
prominence.10 One scholar commented that a substantial body of
6. Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,”
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?,
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985–86 (2003) (noting that various sectors have expressed concern about
increasing amounts of litigation and the effects that it is having on our society and systems).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 986–87.
9. The author does not attempt to estimate the effect that the filing of numerous claims
might have on various American industries, but acknowledges that the topic is one that is, at times,
subject to bias, overstatement, and exaggeration.
10. Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J.
62, 62 (1985) (“[T]he past decade of high anxiety over the burdens placed on our judicial system . . .
has fairly been termed a litigation explosion . . . .”).
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evidence supports the notion of a litigation explosion. Specifically, he
stated, “[l]itigation and its threat have begun to metastasize to virtually
every sector of the economy.”11 Evidence tending to establish the
existence of the litigation explosion and its consequences can be found in
(A) the employment context, (B) the healthcare industry, and (C) in
many other professional contexts.
A. Employment, the American Workplace, and the Litigation Explosion
According to one report, a surge of more than 100,000 employee
suits is overwhelming California courts.12 These suits accuse employers
of various offenses, including: “wrongful firing, wrongful failure to
promote, and departure from policies spelled out in company
employment booklets.”13 The increasing number of claimants in the
system has forced many petitioning employees to wait years before
having their employment matters finally adjudicated.14 This backlog
affects the administration of justice in a variety of ways.15 One scholar
even questioned the wisdom of a legislative proposal he felt was
substantively justifiable because implementation of the proposal would
aggravate “the litigation explosion already present in the field of
employment discrimination.”16 That scholar believed that adoption of the
proposal was exceptionally dangerous because “employment
discrimination is one of the fastest growing areas of civil litigation, with
courts reporting that they are being swamped by these claims.”17 Despite
the fact that the law may have protected important employee rights, the
scholar questioned the practical implications of opening another avenue
for the presentation of employee claims. In summary, a significant body
of evidence indicates that increasing litigation imposes a substantial
burden on American workers, employers, and consumers.

11. OLSON, supra note 1, at 7.
12. Id. at 18.
13. Id. at 8.
14. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to
Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 593 (1995)
(“Judges see the employment litigation explosion adding to the backlog that forces litigants to wait
for years before getting to trial . . . .”). In addition to overwhelming both judges and judicial staff,
the backlog frustrates litigants whose conflicts are extended by the judicial system’s inability to get
these matters speedily resolved.
15. Legislative enactments that might alleviate problems that exist in the workplace are
sometimes refused and vetoed because of their potential to contribute to the litigation explosion.
16. Peter J. Longo, The Human Genome Project’s Threat to the Human Constitution:
Protections from Nebraska Constitutionalism, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 17 (1999).
17. Id. (citing Karen A. Haase, Mixed Metaphores: Model Civil Jury Instructions for Title VII
Disparate Treatment Claims, 76 NEB L. REV. 900, 901 (1997)) (emphasis added).
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B. Healthcare, the Insurance Industry, and the Litigation Explosion
Increasing claims plague the health care industry too. “For many
[physicians], a labor of love has become an agonizing search for
insurance to ensure continued practice in an industry for which they
trained eight, fifteen, or even twenty years.”18 The increasing cost of
malpractice insurance is, at least partially, the result of more claims and
expanding jury verdicts.19 Increasing costs impact all levels of the
healthcare hierarchy, including physicians, health care providers, and the
very individuals seeking medical treatment. Various statistics, reports,
and articles reveal the significance of the problem.20 Nationwide,
insurance premiums have increased by 50 percent since 1975.21 A Wall
Street analyst estimated that healthcare costs grew “seven to eight times
faster than revenue” for one California healthcare provider.22 Some argue
that these cost increases are attributable to implementation of cutting
edge treatments. But, medical research was introducing new treatment
options in previous years too. Thus, recent increases in cost of healthcare
are not solely a result of new treatment options.
The increasing cost of healthcare puts a pinch on employers desirous
to provide such security for employees. For example, the sizeable
General Electric Company reported that its earnings “went up seven
percent [in 2002], but [its] healthcare costs went up fourteen percent.”23
Further explaining the depth and breadth of current trends in the
healthcare industry, one author noted:
Health care costs [now] consume more than fourteen percent of the
United States gross domestic product. Medicare spending alone totaled
approximately $162 billion and $198 billion for fiscal years 1995 and
1996 respectively . . . the problem of rising healthcare costs [is] well
known.24

18. Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance and Damage Caps: Getting
Beyond Band-Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve Quality and Safety in Healthcare,
30 AM. J.L. & MED. 501, 502 (2004).
19. Increased jury verdicts and an increased number of claims both impose a costly burden
on insurers who must find money to pay the bills whether those verdicts are increasingly frequent or
increasingly large.
20. Many of these reports and studies are explained in the remaining portions of this Section.
21. Liang & Ren, supra note 18, at 505.
22. Reed Abelson, Already Battered, Tenet Reduces Earnings Forecast for Rest of Year,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at C1.
23. Steven Greenhouse, Stirring Words, Realist Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2003, at BU2.
24. Judith Parker, Corporate Practice of Medicine: Last Stand or Final Downfall, 29 AHA J.
HEALTH LAW 160 (1996).
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Malpractice insurance is increasingly expensive, and healthcare costs
are rising as a result. Pinpointing the cause of rising malpractice
insurance is difficult because numerous factors simultaneously contribute
to the cost increases. Potentially relevant factors include fluctuating
interest rates,25 greed (in both the insurance companies and medical
professionals),26 a more dangerous living environment,27 and the
extension of life expectancy,28 to name a few. Recognizing the potential
impact of these alternative factors, adherents to the litigation explosion
theory maintain that increasing lawsuits are the principal culprits. Their
claim is supported by several statistical studies. One such study emerged
as the tort reform debate raged in Florida. At that time, the Florida
Hospital Association hired Milliman USA, Inc. (“Milliman”) to evaluate
the cause of rising insurance premiums. Among other things, the
Milliman Report revealed that the total amount of paid claims in Florida
for the year 2000 was more than 150 percent higher than the amount paid
in 1991.29 The study also found that the frequency of medical
malpractice claims in Florida increased significantly between 1991 and
2000. In 1991, 4.82 claims were filed per 100,000 residents; in 2000,
7.56 claims were filed per 100,000 residents.30 Accordingly, the
25. See LAYLOCK, supra note 3, at 171. Laycock explained the effect that fluctuating interest
rates can have on the price of insurance: In the early 1980’s, when insurance rates were very high,
the insurance industry set rates below the expected level of losses to attract immediate business.
Premium dollars could be immediately invested: claims would be paid years later. Investment
earnings more than offset the underwriting losses. When interest rates declined insurers lost money,
but the plaintiff’s bar said that was the natural consequence of the insurance market’s relation to
interest rates. On this view of the facts, big premium increases were also the result of declining
interest rates. Insureds got an unusually large return from their insurers’ investment when rates were
high; now that the interest rates are low, their premiums have to cover the nearly the full value of
their expected claims.
Id.
26. Avoiding meaningful analysis by labeling insurance providers as “greedy,” while popular
in current political rhetoric, disregards the fact that while greed is inherent in capitalism, the emotion
also serves as a check upon itself. If an insurance company charges exorbitant rates for the sole
purpose of accentuating already healthy profits, other start-up insurers (also “greedy” for a profit)
will, in time, provide those services at a reduced rate.
27. In our industrialized and automated society, accidents and injuries are more likely than
ever to occur. Additonally, recreational activities such as skiing, rock climbing, and other such
activities, increasingly put the insured in harm’s way.
28. An aging population requires more medical services, and more medical services increase
the likelihood of malpractice and injury as well as the likelihood of tort litigation. Additionally, an
aging population indicates that more medical procedures are being performed on the elderly; such
operations are inherently more unpredictable and dangerous than similar operations performed on
younger individuals. See e.g., The U.S. Death Rate Drops; Life Expectancy Rises, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 19, 2006, A1 (“The government also said yesterday that the US life expectancy had inched up
again to a record high of 77.9 years.”).
29. See LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 136.
30. Id.
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Milliman report seems to indicate that insurance rates have increased
because of a significant spike in the number of legal claims filed and
because of the consequential increase in expenditures to defend and
satisfy those claims.31
C. Impact of the Litigation Explosion: Beyond the Employment and
Healthcare Context
Increased litigation affects a broad range of people and industries.
Studies reveal that professionals in various sectors worry about shielding
themselves from the burden of lawsuits and litigation. For example, one
study noted that, “[malpractice insurance] is a crushing expense for many
accountants, nurses, amateur sports umpires, and local charity
volunteers.”32 While these industries are not as effected by the litigation
explosion as participants in other industries are, the effect of increasing
litigiousness is broadly felt. Individuals pressing for reform of the
judicial system contend that the propensity of Americans to litigate when
problems arise is driving up costs and imposing a burden on various
industrial sectors, groups, and individuals.33 They contend that the
litigation explosion “has given the legal profession a more and more
prominent role in the running of the business and medical worlds,
academia and public service, entertainment and sports—virtually every
walk of American life.”34
A substantial and accumulating body of evidence lends support to
the existence of a litigation explosion. While the evidence does not
conclusively establish its existence,35 or define its parameters and
implications, the litigation explosion has become a topic at the forefront

31. But see The de-Haven Smith Report. It should be noted that other studies tend to produce
alternative results. The Florida Academy of Trial Lawyers commissioned a similar study. The
Academy reported its finding in the de-Haven Smith Report (“Smith Report”). That report found that
the total number of malpractice claims peaked in 1996, then dropped in the ensuing years, before
resuming a temporary upward trend again in 1999. The report also concluded that the number of
claims involving extraordinary amounts had not increased in frequency during the past decade.
Contrary to the Milliman Report, the Smith Report seems to indicate that the number of claims filed
has not increased, and implies that increasing insurance premiums must be attributable to other
factors.
32. OLSON, supra note 1, at 8.
33. See Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. L. No. 89-7 at 59 (statement of Rep.
Biggins) (stating that the Girl Scouts in Southern Illinois must sell 53,000 boxes of cookies a year to
cover their liability expenses).
34. OLSON, supra note 1, at 9.
35. See e.g., Miller, supra note 6, at 996 (“The foregoing shows that the supposed litigation
crisis is the product of assumption; that reliable empirical data is in short supply; and that data exist
that support any proposition. Thus, one should be cautious and refrain from trumpeting conclusions
on the subject lest it distract us from serious inquiry.”) (emphasis added).
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of current political, legal, and social debate.36 It has already “engaged the
attention of all three branches of the federal government as well as many
state legislatures.”37 Further, “an avalanche of literature, both
professional and popular, has addressed the problem and advanced
numerous overlapping solutions.”38 Accumulating evidence and
commentary supports the notion that a litigation explosion is occurring
within the United States judicial system even if questions as to the cause
and desirability of the explosion remain unexplained.
The time has come for the legal profession to quickly and thoroughly
examine the numerous proposals that have been advanced to deal with
the litigation explosion. These reform proposals include: an absolute cap
on non-economic damages, the total abolishment of joint and several
liability, shortening the time wherein suits may be filed in accordance
with the applicable statute of limitations, a proposed limitation on the
rates that can be charged in contingency fee arrangements, and a feeshifting system analogous to the British approach.39 This Article does not
review all of the proposed reforms. Instead, it considers the effect that
fee shifting, damage caps, tighter restrictions on attorney advertising, and
more rigid measures to preclude frivolous lawsuits, will have on the
American judicial system if they are generally adopted.
II. FEE SHIFTING TO REDUCE LITIGATION
Proponents of reform contend that adopting the British fee-shifting
model represents a viable alternative to decrease the number of claims
filed and eliminate the consequences of the litigation explosion.40
Specifically, these persons allege that the current approach, whereby
each party bears its own legal fees and expenses, provides no incentive
for a plaintiff to assess personally the merits of his or her case before

36. Id. at 985. (“The contemporary perception of a crisis in the judicial system first became
prominent in the 1970s . . . . For example, former Vice President Dan Quayle, speaking as the head
of the President’s Council on Competitiveness, maintained that federal civil litigation had almost
tripled between 1960 and 1990, and that in 1989 alone eighteen million new lawsuits were filed—
almost one lawsuit for every ten American adults. The recent outcry in this country over the social
costs of civil litigation is unprecedented in its decibel level and sense of urgency, bringing together a
coalition of politicians, lawmakers, business people, and scholars that often bridges traditional lines
between conservative and liberal ideologies.”) (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 986.
38. Id.
39. See e.g., LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 170–71 (describing many proposals to rectify the
litigation explosion, the healthcare crisis, and the increasing legal expenditures and costs that some
believe are plaguing American industries).
40. Jonathan Fischbach & Michael Fischbach, Rethinking Optimality in Tort Litigation: The
Promise of Reverse Cost Fee Shifting, 19 B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 317, 317 (2005).
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filing suit.41 They seek to replace the current American approach42 with a
rule that requires the losing party to bear the legal costs associated with
litigating the particular matter. This, they contend, would squeeze many
lawsuits out of the system by discouraging substantively “weaker”
lawsuits.43
To understand the significance of this proposed reform, a brief
review of the British Rule and American Rule is helpful.
A. The British (“Loser Pays”) Rule
The English legal system employs the “loser pays” rule, to provide
remedies after adjudication.44 In its purest form, the “loser pays” rule
requires the defeated party to pay all of the prevailing party’s attorney
fees.45 Accordingly, liability for legal expenses automatically flows from
a defendant to the prevailing plaintiff, or from a plaintiff to the prevailing
defendant upon judicial resolution of their dispute.46 This shifting of fees
occurs automatically and the party adjudged to have lost the case is liable
for the legal expenses that he or she imposed on the prevailing party. The
British Rule does not consider the margin of victory in determining the
losing parties liability to reimburse legal fees.47 Nor does it evaluate the
substantive basis of the losing parties claims.
Proponents argue that the British Rule promotes fundamental
principles underlying the law of remedies by restoring the prevailing
party more fully to its rightful position48—the position that he or she
41. The combination of plaintiffs whose resources are protected by a contingency fee
structure and counsel who may invest a minimal amount of time attempting to settle these cases fails
to encourage even cursory analysis of the merits before a claim is filed.
42. Which has been deemed the “American Rule.”
43. Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 79
(Winter, 1997) (The approach would “encourage stronger lawsuits, and discourage weaker ones by
rewarding victorious claims and imposing a penalty for those that lose.”); see also Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139, 143 (1984).
While the effect of fee-shifting might have a particularly strong effect in contingency cases,
imposing a potential penalty on the plaintiff for losing would cause self-analysis prior to filing in all
cases.
44. John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocations: The Injured Person’s
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1569 (1993).
45. This is known as two-sided fee shifting. A prevailing party is entitled to legal fees from
its opponent regardless of whether the prevailing party is the plaintiff or the defendant.
46. See Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 40, at 320.
47. See Thomas D. Rowe, Indemnity or Compensation? The Contract with America, LoserPays Attorney Fee Shifting, and a One-Way Alternative, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 317, 321–22 (1998)
(arguing that a responsible system should consider the margin of victory as well as the substantive
grounds upon which a defeated party’s case was based before requiring that party to compensate the
prevailing party for its legal expenses).
48. See e.g., LAYLOCK, supra note 3, at 15 (“The fundamental principle of [remedies] is to
restore the injured party as nearly as possible to the position that he would have been in but for the
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would have occupied had the wrong never occurred.49 To fully restore a
prevailing plaintiff to its “rightful position,” the law must provide
damages for the particular injury that she sustained and for the legal
expenses that plaintiff incurred in protecting pertinent rights. Conversely,
a defendant who establishes that she was not liable for the complained-of
damages is entitled to compensation for the fees and costs required to
establish her innocence.
Advocates of the British Rule contend that it provides a substantial
incentive for parties to settle their differences out of court.50 In close
cases,51 parties might settle to avoid the risk of being liable for legal
expenses.52 Such settlements, proponents of the British Rule argue,
would further reduce the amount of litigation crowding the judicial
system.
B. The Current Approach or American Rule
Shortly after gaining its independence in 1796, the United States
departed from the British fee-shifting rule.53 The United States Supreme
Court explained the reason for abolishing the British Rule in the case of
Arcambel v. Wiseman.54 In that case, the Court held that attorney fees
were not recoverable unless specifically authorized by legislation. After
striking down the award of attorney fees at issue in the case, the Court
stated, “We do not think that this charge [of attorney fees from the losing
party] ought to be allowed. The general practice of the United States is in
opposition to it . . . .”55 American judges and legislators deeply desired
open access to courtrooms. One justice underscored the importance of
such access, explaining:
The right to sue and defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In
wrong.”).
49. The author acknowledges that some juries might already adjust the damage award to
effectuate a more full recovery, but simultaneously notes that the British Rule, standing by its
expressed terms, more fully comports with this principle of the law of remedies than the American
Rule does when limited to its expressed terms.
50. Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 40, at 331.
51. The term “close cases” refers to cases that are likely to require a significant amount of
time and money before they are resolved.
52. Uncertainty that leads to settlement is more likely when the consequences of litigation are
raised. Accordingly, parties to litigation will be more likely to settle when additional liabilities are
imposed upon them.
53. In essence, the new approach treated legal fees as an ancillary matter. As an independent
and separate matter, it was contemplated and awarded without reference to the underlying cause of
action.
54. 3 U.S. 306 (1796).
55. Id.
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an organized society it is the right conservative of all other rights, and
lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and
most essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each
State to the citizens of all . . . .56

To ensure the access it valued, the Court adopted the “American
Rule.” The rule imposes upon each litigant the responsibility to bear his
or her own legal expenses.57 The American Rule construes legal fees “as
an ancillary matter, separate from the merits,” of a case and provides that
a prevailing litigant will not recover such expenditures unless
“specifically authorized by a particular rule or statute.”58
C. Implications of Replacing the American Rule with the British Rule
Replacing the American Rule with the British Rule would reduce
litigation. After all, “[i]t is self-evident that parties make litigation and
settlement decisions based on the procedural setting, and not just on the
merits, of a given case.”59 By imposing an obligation on parties to pay
the legal costs of a prevailing opponent, the law would create a stiff
procedural deterrent to litigation.60 As a general matter, only plaintiffs
who are substantially confident about the merits of their case would file
claims. By increasing the potential costs of litigation, adopting the
British Rule would reduce the filing of claims.61 However, replacing the
American Rule with the British Rule is not without consequences.
1. Adoption of the British Rule would reduce access to courts.
“Citizens in the United States place a high premium on the option to
go to court, and the deterrent effect of the British Rule undoubtedly
closes the courthouse doors to many low-income parties.”62 Aware that
56. Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907).
57. See e.g., Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
(superceded by statute as stated in Perez v. Rodriguez Bou, 575 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1978)).
58. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 912–15.
59. Molot, supra note 43, at 60 (“In particular, lawyers and clients alike understand that the
cost of litigation may affect outcomes.”). The potential cost of litigation may also affect the client’s
willingness to pursue a legal remedy and incur legal costs. See infra note 172 and accompanying
text.
60. Thus, in this context the question becomes whether the deterrent provided is too
substantial and arduous.
61. As explained in part II C 1., proponents of the British Rule are correct when they assert
that its adoption would reduce the number of claims presented to American tribunals. Judicial
systems that adhere to the British approach experience less litigation per capita than courts in the
United States do. See e.g., Atiyah, supra note 2.
62. Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 40, at 331.
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limiting access to such an extensive degree is generally unacceptable,
some reform advocates have tempered their demands by lobbying for
proportional fee shifting.63 Under this approach a plaintiff is only
responsible for a portion of a particular defendant’s legal fees.64 While
proportional fee shifting might impede access to courts less than
traditional fee shifting would,65 any risk of out-of-pocket expenses is a
substantial deterrent to poor plaintiffs.66
Wealthy individuals in possession of monetarily insignificant claims
might also hesitate before introducing their claims into the court system.
This is because the potential benefit of prevailing on a minor claim
frequently fails to outweigh the costs associated with protecting that
right, especially when the added risk of being liable for the prevailing
parties legal fees is included in the analysis.
If the British Rule is adopted, it is safe to assume that litigation will
decrease. However, access to the judicial system will be severely
limited.67
2. By adopting the British Rule, the judicial system would unduly favor
parties with disposable resources and perhaps violate the Due Process
Clause.
Though it is intertwined with the previous point, that adoption of the
“British Rule” would reduce access to courts, it is worth noting
separately that implementation of the British Rule may render the rights
of the wealthy more secure than the rights of the poverty stricken or
underprivileged.68 Adopting the British Rule is “particularly troubling
63. Id. This is also known as fee shifting by percentage.
64. See id.
65. For a poor plaintiff, the potential of being liable for $5500 may not be much more
daunting than the potential of being liable for $11,000. Both amounts represent a substantial danger.
66. While a poor plaintiff may not have much money to lose, the risk of losing even a small
amount is likely to be poignantly felt in most cases.
67. See Chambers v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907) (“The right to sue and
defend in the courts is the alternative of force. In an organized society it is the right conservative of
all other rights, and lies at the foundation of orderly government. It is one of the highest and most
essential privileges of citizenship, and must be allowed by each State to the citizens of all . . . .”).
68. See e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967),
superceded by statute as stated by United Phosphorus v. Midland Fumigant, 21 F. Supp. 1255 (D.
Kan. 1998), and Decorations For Generations, Inc. v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26608 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2003).
In support of the American Rule, it has been argued that since litigation is at best
uncertain one should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit, and
that the poor might be unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their
rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents’ counsel. Also, the
time, expense, and difficulties of proof inherent in litigating the question of what
constitutes reasonable attorney’s fees would pose substantial burdens for judicial
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because it imposes this chilling effect disproportionately on private
litigants opposing individually wealthy or commercial defendants who
rapidly accumulate legal expenses.”69 Two hypothetical, but realistic,
examples sufficiently demonstrate the inequality that fee shifting
imposes.
In both cases, suppose that an uninsured plaintiff suffers a minor
injury (perhaps a broken arm) as a result of a low-speed car crash with an
uninsured driver. Upon examination of the case, the plaintiff’s attorney
informs his client that the likelihood of establishing liability is
approximately 60 percent, this being a “good case.” Hypothetical
Plaintiff “A” falls into the middle socio-economic class, making
approximately $115,000 per year. Plaintiff “A” has very little debt and
some disposable income. Conversely Plaintiff “B” falls into a lower
socio-economic class, making approximately $25,000 per year. Plaintiff
“B” has little disposable money.
Plaintiff “B” may hesitate to file a legal action because the threat of
being responsible for the legal fees of the adverse party is very daunting
and troubling in light of his financial situation. Conversely, a semiprosperous plaintiff such as Plaintiff “A” would worry less (to some
degree) about incurring liability for the prevailing parties fees.70 This fact
holds true even if a proportional approach71 to fee shifting is adopted
instead of the traditional British Rule. In most instances an individual or
entity with disposable income is more willing to assume financial risk
than an individual with less income. The disparate treatment that a fee
shifting system imposes on individuals is even more substantial when the
financial status of the parties is more exaggerated. Thus, a multimillionaire or a large corporation would possess a far greater capacity to
protect their legal rights than a similarly injured person with less income
and assets.72
Fundamental principles of the American judicial system forbid
treating litigants differently on the basis of their economic status.73 “Over
the past two decades one of the most important trends in both judicial
administration. (Emphasis added).
69. Fischbach & Fischbach, supra note 40, at 331.
70. Though incurring liability is still a substantial consideration for Plaintiff A.
71. Under a proportional fee shifting approach, the losing party would be responsible for only
a limited portion of the victorious party’s legal expenditures. While the potential amount of the
party’s liability would decrease, a poor person still feels the loss of a set amount of money in a way
that a wealthier person does not.
72. While this may already be the case, implementation of the British Rule in place of the
American Rule would expand the disparity.
73. Mason v. Henderson, 35 F.Supp. 35, 37–38 (E.D. La. 1972) (“Due Process requires . . .
that all persons, rich or poor, young or old, be accorded equal treatment.”).
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and legislative decisions has been the enormous thrust to equalize the
treatment of rich and poor in the courts.”74 Yet, fee shifting unequally
deters poor people from filing claims. For this reason, fee-shifting
systems contradict fundamental principles of equality and fairness that
are imbedded in the American judicial system.
In addition to treating participants differently depending on their
financial status, adoption of the British Rule might provide additional
incentive for wealthy parties to extend litigation and run up legal costs as
an intimidation strategy.75 By such tactics, a wealthy defendant could
gain a superior bargaining position. Additionally, such conduct would
crowd the judicial system by keeping cases on court dockets for longer
periods of time, and forcing judges to review more preliminary motions.
3. Exceptions to the American rule substantially limit its scope already.
Many exceptions to the American Rule exist, though critics of the
rule frequently fail to acknowledge them. “Cumulatively, these
exceptions take a huge bite out of the American Rule.”76 In many
instances, the rule that the prevailing party cannot recover attorney’s fees
is subject to an exception already.77 The existence of these exceptions
makes adoption of the British Rule seem less necessary.
Adopting the British Rule will significantly affect the ability of
citizens to petition courts for a redress of their grievances. Additionally,
adoption of the British approach renders the rights of rich parties better
protected than the rights of poor persons. Because these two
consequences are significant, the judicial system should be particularly
concerned about proposals that automatically shift fees to prevailing
parties.

74. Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see also Tate v. United States, 359
F.2d 245, 252 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting that “equal treatment for rich and poor” is a vital component
of the judicial system); McCord v. Polozola, 555 F.Supp. 996, 997 (N.D. La. 1983) (“Beyond a
doubt one of the most important functions of a federal court is to steadfastly guard the rights and
privileges secured by the Constitution . . . [and] a court’s obligation in this regard is owed equally to
the rich and poor.”) (emphasis added).
75. Consider a case where a poor plaintiff brings suit against a wealthy corporate defendant.
The defendant could obtain unequal bargaining power by extending and delaying the legal process to
expand its legal bill. As that figure increases, the Plaintiffs willingness to settle the case in
accordance with the terms of the defendant would also increase. While this strategy is employed in
the current American system, adoption of the British system would provide additional incentive for
its implementation.
76. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 913.
77. David W. Robertson, Court-Awarded Attorneys’ Fees in Maritime Cases: The “American
Rule” in Admiralty, 27 J. MAR. L & COM. 507 (1996). Robertson identifies various exceptions
including: statutory exceptions, the bad faith litigation exception, contract exceptions, a family law
exception, the collateral litigation exception, and the contempt-of-court exception.
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III. DAMAGE CAPS TO CURB THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION
Damage caps are another proposed response to the litigation
explosion.78 These caps aim to reduce the number of claims filed by
removing the incentive to file a claim that accompanies the potential of
an extraordinary verdict.79 Damage caps also minimize the impact of the
litigation explosion by alleviating the legal expenses and financial
vulnerability that numerous claims impose on defendants.80 Despite these
potential benefits, damage cap statutes are constitutionally controversial
and blatantly unfair when applied in some instances.81
A. Constitutional Implications
The enactment of damage caps raises significant constitutional
concerns. 82 Judicial consideration of these caps generally focuses on
whether caps unconstitutionally modify the right to a jury trial, and on
whether they represent undue usurpation of judicial power. Indeed, “[t]he
constitutionality of damage caps has been one of the most controversial
aspects of . . . reform in many states . . . .”83 Courts have reached
inconsistent conclusions when called upon to determine whether damage
caps comport with constitutional doctrines. The Virginia Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality of a damage cap84 in the case of
78. Matthew W. Stevens, Strictly No Strict Liability: The 1995 Amendments to Chapter 99B,
the Products Liability Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2240, 2240 (1996) (“From the movements beginnings in
the mid-1980s, states have attempted to contain the apparent litigation explosion of the last decade
with a wide array of legislation, including damage caps and other changes . . . .”) (emphasis added).
79. Because the sky seems to be the limit, plaintiffs frequently overestimate the value of their
cases. Such overestimation provides an incentive to litigate.
80. According to this theoretical advantage, damage caps do not significantly reduce
litigation. Instead, they alleviate the financial burden that numerous claims impose on parties who
frequently find themselves the targets of these lawsuits. Damage caps aim to ensure that that liability
is predictable and manageable for defendants who might otherwise be overwhelmed by numerous
claims.
81. Many states have already enacted statutory provisions to limit damage recoveries.
Accordingly, cases, commentary, and information regarding the consequences of damage caps are
developing.
82. See Alfreda A. Sellers Diamond, Constitutional Comparisons and Converging Histories:
Historical Developments in Equal Educational Opportunity Under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution and the New South African Constitution, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 853
(1999) (Author notes that adoption of a constitution represents adoption of a foundation for the
citizens and society.). As constitutional precepts are the foundational precepts upon which society is
built, a proposed restraint that raises constitutional questions should be carefully considered as the
proposal has substantial potential to shift society in unanticipated ways.).
83. Chad E. Stewart, Damage Caps in Alabama’s Civil Justice System: An Uncivil War
within the State, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 201, 203 (1999).
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01–581.15 (1989) (limiting the amount of damages recoverable in a
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Etheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals.85 In that case, the plaintiff
suffered severe and permanent injuries. The trial court attributed the
injuries to the negligence of an attending physician. The court reduced
the jury verdict of $2.75 million to $750,000 pursuant to a statute
capping damages.86 Plaintiff appealed to the Virginia Supreme Court,
which held that the damage cap was constitutionally permissible and
appropriately applied.87
The Florida Supreme Court reached the opposite result upon
consideration of a similar damage cap. In the case of Smith v.
Department of Insurance, that Court held that “the cap on noneconomic
damages is contrary to Article I, § 2188 of the Florida Constitution.”89
Specifically, the court stated:
A plaintiff who receives a jury verdict for, [] $1,000,000, has not
received a constitutional redress of injuries if the legislature statutorily,
and arbitrarily, caps the recovery at $450,000. Nor, we add, because the
jury verdict is being arbitrarily capped, is the plaintiff receiving the
constitutional benefit of a jury trial as we have heretofore understood
that right.90

The inconsistencies expressed in the Smith case and the Etheridge
case aptly demonstrate the “deep split among state supreme courts over
the constitutionality of damage caps.”91 While there is no consensus,92
“the majority of courts reviewing challenges under the constitutions of
their respective states have invalidated limitations on damages.”93 In
addition to Alabama and Florida, the Illinois Supreme Court recently
held that a damage cap provision violated the Illinois constitution.94
Specifically, the Illinois Court held that the statutory cap violated the
separation of powers doctrine as the cap unduly hindered the judicial
branch’s power and obligation to prevent excessive verdicts through the
medical malpractice action).
85. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
86. Id. at 526 (The statutory damage cap provided that compensatory damage awards in
medical malpractice could not exceed $750,000 per occurrence.).
87. Id. at 526–27.
88. FLA. CONST. ART. I, § 21 (1987) (“The courts shall be open to every person for redress of
any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay.”).
89. Smith v. Dep’t of Ins., 507 So.2d 1080 (Fla. 1987).
90. Id. at 1088–89 (emphasis added).
91. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 173.
92. Id. at 174 (“There is no serious claim that damage caps on state-law claims violate the
federal constitution.”).
93. Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n., 592 So.2d 156, 158 (Ala. 1991).
94. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1064 (Ill. 1997).
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remittitur power.95
Regardless of the case law that the individual reader finds most
persuasive, these cases introduce constitutional considerations that must
accompany responsible review of the merits and consequences of
damage caps. Specifically, the reader should consider the effect of
damage caps on (1) the right to a jury trial, and (2) the separation of
powers doctrine before advocating the adoption of damage caps.
1. The right to a jury trial.
The right to a jury trial is a constitutionally protected one.96 Yet,
damage caps intrude on that right.97 While jurors retain discretion in the
realm of liability, the ability of jurors to award the damages they deem
proper is substantially limited when the legislature enacts a damage
cap.98 Stripping this power from jurors is a monumental change. After
all, “[a]ssessment of the quantum of damages as a function of the jury in
actions at law [is] deeply entrenched” in our legal system.99
The adoption of statutory damage caps may, or may not, be
constitutional.100 Regardless, implementation of these caps significantly
limits the discretion and responsibility of jurors. In so doing, damage
caps change traditional concepts about what happens in a jury trial.
Damage caps reduce the litigant’s constitutional entitlement from one
commanding that a jury reach a unanimous verdict on both the
questions of liability and damages, to one requiring that a jury reach a
unanimous verdict on the question of liability alone. Under this
scheme, the jury reaches the question of damages only if not preempted by legislative fiat from doing so.101

95. Id. Whether they violate the right to a jury trial or not, the enactment of damage caps are
inconsistent with the right to a jury trial as traditionally understood. See generally Smith, 507 So.2d
1080.
96. See e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VII (2006) (“In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.”).
97. See e.g., Smith 507 So.2d at 1088–89 (wherein the Court felt like the intrusion was
sufficient to render the damage cap provision unconstitutional).
98. By adopting a damage cap, the legislature inserts its determination in place of the juries
with regard to liability and damages.
99. Paul Weiss, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh Amendment, 38
CATH. U. L. REV. 737, 746 (1989)”The common law required a jury to assess a plaintiff’s damages
whenever the amount sued for was an unliquidated or uncertain sum.” Id. Until the perceived
litigation explosion of recent times “no one has seriously suggested that assessment of the amount of
a plaintiff’s damages in a common law of action is anything but a question for the jury.” Id.
100. Smith and Etheridge reached different determinations on this point.
101. Weiss, supra note 99, at 765.
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The implementation of damage caps would, at a minimum, modify
the constitutional right to a jury trial and the nature of judicial
proceedings. Recognition of this impact, and further consideration of its
significance, should precede formal adoption of damage cap provisions.
2. Damage Caps Narrow, Perhaps Unconstitutionally, the Separation
between Powers102
The legal doctrine of remittitur provides a “procedure by which trial
and appellate judges reduce jury verdicts” that they deem excessive.103
By the remittitur doctrine courts may reduce the jury verdict to the
highest amount that the court deems reasonable in the circumstances.104
Accordingly, courts already possess the power to review jury verdicts for
reasonableness. Legislatures usurp this judicial power when they
preemptively review the reasonableness of verdicts by adopting statutory
damage caps.105
The doctrine of remittitur represents a more effective mechanism to
review the reasonableness of awards106 than statutorily imposed damage
caps do. Courts apply the remittitur concept upon examining the facts of
the case. Legislative bodies, on the other hand, enact damage caps before
the cases that the statute will govern even exist. Accordingly, damage
caps frequently fail to properly address the presented situation.107
Remittitur, on the other hand, is less arbitrary and more informed. Courts
review the verdict in light of the facts to determine whether the amount
awarded is reasonable. If the award is unreasonable, the presiding judge
reduces it.108
Acknowledging the existence of remittitur tarnishes the appeal of
damage caps, and upon deeper consideration even makes these caps
appear entirely unnecessary. Perhaps using the doctrine of remittutur
more frequently is a better way of responding to extraordinary verdicts
than damage caps are. At a minimum, the legislature intrudes on the
102. This argument persuaded the Illinois Supreme Court to declare that a damage cap enacted
by the state’s legislature was unconstitutional. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057,
1064 (Ill. 1997).
103. LAYCOCK, supra note 3, at 189.
104. Id.
105. See e.g., Stewart, supra note 83, at 225.
106. See e.g., Levka v. City of Chicago, 748 F.2d 421 (1984) (jury returned a verdict of
$50,000 in favor of the plaintiff). On appeal the court noted, “[T]he award of $50,000 in this case is
grossly excessive and must be reduced.” Id. By the process of remittitur the court reduced the award
to $25,000, which it believed was reasonable. Id.
107. The next section sets forth in detail the injustices that result from the statutory imposition
of damage caps.
108. See generally Levka, 748 F.2d 421.
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authority of the judicial branch, as provided by the remittitur doctrine,
when it enacts damage caps.
B. Arbitrary Damage Caps Frequently Impose Harsh and Unfair Results
Because legislators paint with broad strokes when they craft statutory
law, damage cap provisions frequently impose harsh and unjust results in
individual cases.109 The case of State v. DeFoor110 is illustrative. That
case involved a damage cap that limited recovery against the state for
traffic accidents to $400,000 per occurrence.111 In 1992, a state employee
dislodged a boulder. It rolled down a mountain and struck a bus.112 Nine
people were killed and approximately twenty-five injured.113 Application
of the pertinent damage cap provision left each of the victims with the
prospect of recovering a maximum of $11,000.114 Such absurd results
inevitably attend legislative remedies that are enacted prior to the factual
record that they govern.115 President Clinton noted his concern for harsh
results that were unavoidable as he vetoed a federal damage cap
proposal.116 Perhaps in so doing, he recognized the problem inherent in
damage caps. There will always be extraordinary cases wherein
application of definitive rules is improper.
While damage caps alleviate the consequences of the litigation
explosion, strict application of these caps also effectuates unjust results
in individual cases. Lawmakers should contemplate and account for the
potential for unjust results prior to enacting such caps. Similarly,
legislators should consider the constitutional implications associated with
damage caps.

109. The breadth of cases to which a statute is intended to apply frequently renders the statute
unresponsive to individual cases.
110. State v. DeFoor, 824 P.2d 783 (Colo. 1992).
111. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-114(1) (2006) (the per occurrence amount provided for in the
statute is now $600,000 total and limited to no more than $150,000 per individual claimant).
112. DeFoor, 824 P.2d at 785.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 802.
115. See infra note 129.
116. See infra note 133.
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IV. LAWYER ADVERTISING: EXAMINING STRICTER CONSTRAINTS ON
LAWYER SOLICITATION OF CLIENTS
Persons who lobby for reform of the judicial system argue that the
aggressive advertising practices of lawyers contribute significantly to
increasing litigation in the United States.117 They contend that lawyer
advertisements encourage litigation among parties who might not
otherwise engage the process.118 In this way, advertising by lawyers
directly results in more claims being filed.119 To reduce the filing of
claims, they propose more rigid prohibitions on advertising by attorneys.
While a reduction in advertising would reduce the number of claims
filed, proponents of these measures fail to acknowledge that the bar
already imposes significant limitations on lawyer advertising. Additional
limitations on lawyer communications would interfere with
constitutional rights and increase the cost of legal fees.
A. The Bar Imposes Limitations on the Nature and Scope of Lawyer
Advertising
Concerned that advertising might negatively affect the public’s
perception120 of lawyers, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct limit
the nature and scope of lawyer advertising. As a general rule, advertising
is permitted.121 However, various rules impose limits on the nature of
permissible communications. First, “[a] lawyer shall not make a false or

117. The claim that lawyer advertising is responsible for fueling the litigation explosion has
been made for a long time. Those concerned about the advertising practices of lawyers became
increasingly concerned subsequent to Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), which
eliminated many of the States most stringent restrictions on the permissible scope of advertising by
lawyers.
118. See e.g., Edward D. Re, Professionalism for the Legal Profession, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 683,
693 (2001).
119. This proposition is not novel. Advertising encourages persons to engage in certain
conduct (such as filing a lawsuit) though they might not otherwise be interested in doing so. See
William Hornsby, Clashes of Class and Cash: Battles from the 150 Years War to Govern Client
Development, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 255, 291 (2005) (“The battles among lawyers [about advertising] are
fueled by the fact that advertising is effective. Simply put, it works. This is not to suggest that every
lawyer who advertises gets a positive return on investment, but constant increases in the overall
expenditures for yellow pages and television ads suggest that the public is responsive to ads to a
degree that justifies the movement.”).
120. See e.g., Tonia Goolsby, Does Ambulance Chasing in Florida Justify Advertising Reform
in Arkansas, 49 ARK. L. REV. 795, 809 (1997) (“a two-year study on lawyer advertising [indicated
that people] have negative feelings about those attorneys who use direct mail advertising.”).
121. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.2 cmt. (2006) (“To assist the public in
obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only through
reputation but also through organized information campaigns in the form of advertising . . . the
public’s need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising.”).
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misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer’s services.”122
Beyond being honest, lawyers must not make any statements that might
mislead. Second, “[a] lawyer shall not by in-person or live telephone
contact solicit professional employment from a prospective client with
whom the lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship when a
significant motive for . . . doing so is the lawyer’s pecuniary gain.”123
Third, lawyers shall not engage in any advertising that “involves
coercion, duress or harassment.”124 These model rules, which are widely
adopted among the states with only slight variations, demonstrate that
state bar associations already significantly restrict the nature and scope of
permissible advertising.125
Though persons critical of the judicial system claim otherwise, these
rules are frequently enforced. In the case of Davis v. Alabama State Bar,
the Alabama Supreme Court upheld a 60-day suspension for lawyers
whose “advertisements were misleading.”126 In the case of In re Morse,
the California Supreme Court increased sanctions against attorneys who
had engaged in misleading advertising to deter similar wrongdoing by
other attorneys.127 New York upheld a disciplinary order when an
attorney solicited work from real estate brokers in violation of the
pertinent ethical guidelines, which precluded any advertisement that
might mislead the audience.128 The cited instances are not exhaustive.
122. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.1 (misleading statements include
statements that would give the client unjustified expectations).
123. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 7.3.
124. Id.
125. Proponents of more rigid restrictions claim that the existing rules do not do enough to
restrict attorney advertising. In the next section, this Article explains that additional restrictions
might violate freedom of speech, which is a foundational right in American society.
126. Davis v. Ala. State Bar, 676 So.2d 306, 309 (Ala. 1996). Among other things:
The Alabama State Bar Disciplinary Board found William Dowsing Davis III and Dan
Arthur Goldberg to be violating Rule 1.1, Alabama Rules of Professional Conduct
(failure to provide competent representation); Rule 1.4(a) and (b) (failure to keep clients
reasonably informed and failure to reasonably explain a matter so as to permit a client to
make an informed decision); Rule 5.1 (failure to make reasonable efforts to ensure that
the lawyers in their firm conformed to the Rules of Professional Conduct); Rule 5.3(b)
(failure to ensure that the activities of a nonlawyer under an attorney’s supervision are
compatible with professional standards); Rule 5.5(b) (providing assistance to a person
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law); Rule 8.4(a) (violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct through the acts of another); Rule 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice); and Rule 8.4(g) (engaging in conduct that
adversely reflects on a lawyer’s fitness to practice law). Both of the attorneys were
suspended from the practice of law for 60 days.
127. In re Morse, 900 P.2d 1170 (Cal. 1995).
128. In re Green, 429 N.E.2d 390, 392 (N.Y. 1981) (indicating the violative mailer provided
that “By recommending the services of [lawyer], you, the realtor, will save your clients time and
money—one of the main reasons that they called on you.”).
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State courts have frequently punished advertisements by lawyers when
their communications fail to comply with adopted regulations.129
As substantial restrictions already exist, the choice presented is not
one between no regulation on lawyer advertising and some regulation.
Instead, the question is whether more rigid restrictions should be
adopted.
B. Important Rights Will Be Infringed If More Significant Restrictions
on Lawyer Advertising are Implemented
Advocates of reform to curb the litigation explosion assert that the
provisions contained in the Model Rules are not sufficient for one
reason130 or another.131 While a complete or more substantial ban on
advertising would reduce the amount of litigation, additional limitations
would also raise important constitutional questions.
In the case of Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the Supreme Court
acknowledged that “[c]onstitutional protection for attorney advertising,
and for commercial speech generally, is of recent vintage.”132 Until the
1970’ s, the Court did not extend the protections of the First Amendment
to protect the advertising communications of lawyers.133 However, the
1977 case of Bates v. State Bar of Arizona134 expanded the protections of
the First Amendment to “invalidate a state rule prohibiting lawyers from
advertising in newspapers and other media.”135 Nearly two decades of
cases have built upon the foundation laid in the Bates case. Now, it is
“well established that lawyer advertising is commercial speech and, as
such, is accorded a measure of First Amendment protection.”136 While
the Court recognized that some restrictions on lawyer advertising, such
as those provided by the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, were
permissible, it held that an absolute prohibition was not.137 Most
European legal systems have reached the same conclusion. They
129. See e.g., Richard Martel, Regulation of Advertising in the Legal Profession: Still Hazy
after All these Years, 1997 DET. C.L. REV. 123 (1997).
130. Some claim that the Model Rules themselves do not go far enough to prevent the ills
associated with lawyers who advertise. In essence, they contend that lawyers should be precluded
from advertising altogether.
131. Others take a more moderate approach. They contend that the Rules should be made
more rigid, and also that they should be enforced with more frequency and with more substantial
penalties.
132. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 622 (1995).
133. Id.
134. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
135. Id.
136. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 622–23 (emphasis added).
137. Id. at 632.
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recognize the fundamental right that lawyers possess to communicate
and advertise.138
Prohibiting lawyers from advertising might reduce the number of
claims filed, but would also prohibit that class of individuals from
exercising rights granted unto them by the Constitution. Any proposal
that effectuates a denial or modification of constitutional rights should be
cautiously considered.
C. Advertising by Lawyers Encourages Competition, which Results in
Lower Prices.
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in the Bates case,139 numerous
studies140 have been conducted to estimate the effects of the expanded
First Amendment protection. Each of these studies arrived at the same
conclusion: “Competition among lawyers, in the form of commercial
advertising, has resulted in lower prices to consumers.”141 Advertising
contributes to a perfect market,142 wherein consumers are able to
compare the hourly rates of attorneys and the service that they render.
Without the unfettered presentation of such information, price and value
comparisons are infinitely more difficult to conduct. Permitting and
protecting advertising has granted citizens an increased ability to
compare the price and quality of legal services.143

138. See e.g., Louise L. Hill, Publicity Rules of the Legal Profession within the United
Kingdom, 20 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 323 (2003) (“Historically, the legal professions in European
countries frowned upon or prohibited advertising by lawyers. . . . [A]s a result, many EU Member
states abandoned their traditional rules prohibiting lawyer advertising in favor of permitting some
form of advertising by lawyers. The jurisdictions of the United Kingdom (UK) were no exception.”)
(emphasis added).
139. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (wherein the United States Supreme
acknowledged that the First Amendment protected the right of lawyers to advertise).
140. Van O’Steen, Bates v. State Bar of Arizona: The Personal Account of a Party and the
Consumer Benefits of Lawyer Advertising, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 245, 250 (Summer, 2005) (“Since Bates,
at least four studies have been conducted—including two through grants from the National Science
Foundation and one by the Federal Trade Commission—intended to measure the effect of
advertising on the pricing of legal services.”).
141. Id. at 251. The author further states, “I know of no research that has concluded otherwise,
and the debate on this question appears settled.” Id.
142. A perfect market is one wherein both the buyer and seller of goods or services possess an
adequate amount of information. Such information allows them to negotiate effectively with one
another and attribute the proper value to the services to be provided.
143. In a sense, the price charged by lawyer “A” serves as a check on the price that lawyer
“B” is able to obtain for services of a similar nature. When parties are unable to ascertain what the
general prices are, there is less of a check and price disparities are more likely to result. The legal
community in Las Vegas has recently experienced price wars attributed to advertising. One personal
injury attorney recently began advertising a contingency fee of 22 percent. Others followed suit.
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V. FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS ARE SUFFICIENTLY CONSTRAINED BY
CURRENT LEGAL DOCTRINES
Legislative disdain for frivolous and vexatious lawsuits is clearly
manifest in prominent places. “Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,144 Rule 3.1 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct,145
and § 170 of the Restatement of Law Governing Lawyers,146 all seek to
balance efforts to curb frivolous suits with an understanding that
prohibitions against such suits should be tempered to avoid overenforcement.”147 Yet, some continue to argue that frivolous lawsuits
contribute to the litigation explosion in an especially egregious
manner.148 In the presidential debates of 1996, the candidates mentioned
the problem of frivolous lawsuits three times.149 Like politicians, some
scholars have also participated in the debate over meritless civil
lawsuits.”150
Judge Posner noted that courts are unable to neatly distinguish valid
144. By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresentative party is certifying that to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry under the circumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other
legal contentions therein are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (2006) (Emphasis added).
145. A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2005) (Emphasis added).
146. A lawyer may not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good-faith argument for an
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.
RESTATEMENT OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, § 110 (2000) (Emphasis added).
147. Erin Shiller & Jeffrey Wertkin, Frivolous Filings and Vexatious Litigation, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 909 (2001).
148. Robert Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims,
36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 805, 806 (2004) (“Frivolous lawsuits are endemic to the entire legal system . . . .”).
149. Jeffrey Parness & Amy Leonetti, Expert Opinion Pleading: Any Merit to Special
Certificates of Merit?, 1997 BYU L. REV. 537, 538 (1997), quotes a statement from those debates
wherein Bill Clinton stated:
In the case of the product liability bill which they passed and I vetoed—I think that’s
what he’s talking about—I actually wanted to sign that bill, and I told the people exactly
what—the Congress exactly what kind of bill I would sign. Now a lot of the trial lawyers
didn’t want me to sign any bill at all, but I thought we ought to do what we could to cut
frivolous lawsuits, but they wouldn’t make some changes that I thought should be made.
Now let me just give you an example. I had a person in the Oval Office who lost a child
in a school bus accident where a drunk driver caused the accident directly, but there were
problems with the school bus. The drunk driver had no money. Under the new bill, if I
had signed it, a person like that could never have had any recovery. I thought that was
wrong.
150. See id.
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cases “from the utterly frivolous ones.”151 The distinction between
frivolous cases and meritorious ones is messy because the determination
depends on subjective application of an ambiguous definition. In the
legal context, the term “frivolous” is defined as “given to triflings, not
worth notice,” and “of little weight or importance, not worth notice of
slight.”152 Accordingly, the subjective perspective of the person called
upon to evaluate a claim determines whether it is frivolous or
meritorious. For this reason, some frivolous cases inevitably find their
way into the system,153 despite the ethical guidelines that prohibit
lawyers from entertaining them.
To further deter the filing of frivolous suits, some individuals
contend that “certificates of merit” issued by designated experts or panels
should be required before certain cases are permitted to proceed.154 These
special certificates impose a more significant burden than already exists
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 11155 by requiring the
claimant to obtain a written expert opinion certifying that the merits of
the particular case are valid. “The major goal typically [justifying the
imposition of certification requirements] is a reduction in the number of
frivolous claims.”156 Many states have already enacted these measures to
reduce litigation in certain contexts. Among these, Illinois requires that a
certificate of merit, issued by an expert, accompany the filing of a
product liability claim.157 Illinois requires a similar certificate when one
files an action for medical malpractice.158 In Florida, a medical
negligence claimant must submit a “verified written medical expert
opinion,” certifying that there are reasonable grounds for the claim
before notice of the lawsuit is mailed.159 Similarly, a Georgia provision
requires a certificate of merit in all civil actions for medical
malpractice.160 California,161 Nevada,162 and the Virgin Islands163 have all
151. Crowley Cutlery Co. v. U.S., 849 F.2d 273, 278 (7th Cir. 1988).
152. See CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, p. 1832 (1986).
153. A case that one judge may deem “frivolous” may be designated “meritorious” by other
judges or legal commentators. Similarly, those cases deemed meritorious by a particular judge may
be criticized as frivolous or baseless by some legal commentators.
154. Id. (“State lawmakers have recently sought to deter certain types of frivolous claims by
requiring special certificates of merit involving the use of an expert opinion.”).
155. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (2006) (implying that an attorney certifies that a claim is
meritorious upon permitting it to be filed for the consideration of the tribunal.).
156. Parness & Leonetti, supra note 149, at 541.
157. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN., Title 735 § 52-622 (requiring affidavit and written report of
an expert before a product liability action can be filed).
158. See 735 ILL. COMP STATE ANN., Title 735, §5/2-622(a). The Illinois law requiring an
expert affidavit for medical malpractice was sustained despite constitutional attack. See DeLuna v.
St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139 (Ill. 1992).
159. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 766.203(2)(b) (2006).
160. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1(a) (2005) (requiring an expert certification after a complaint
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enacted similar requirements. The United States Congress even proposed
such a requirement at the federal level, though President Clinton
ultimately vetoed the measure.164
These measures effectively preclude a number of suits. A reduction
in the number of claims filed comes as no surprise; adding another
procedural impediment makes filing a claim more expensive, more
difficult, and less likely. In addition to the procedural impediments, a
certification panel or expert is likely to prevent the introduction of many
cases, and thereby reduce litigation.
A. Substantial Measures Already Exist to Deter Frivolous Suits from the
System
Various measures already exist to deter frivolous suits from entering
the system. First, various procedural rules prohibit lawyers from
introducing frivolous claims or defenses into the system.165 Among these
prohibitions, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a lawyer may be subject to sanctions for pursuing a frivolous claim
or relying on a frivolous defense. These provisions are frequently
enforced. And “[c]oncern by the courts, particularly the federal courts,
about abuse of judicial process has increased in recent years and has been
manifest by a greater judicial willingness to impose sanctions [pursuant
to Rule 11].”166 In addition to sanctions, lawyers may be punished for
violating codes of professional conduct if they present frivolous claims
or defenses for adjudication.167 Second, the economic realities of modern
legal practice strongly encourage attorneys to refrain from bringing cases

and answer are filed “[in] any action for damages for personal injuries, wrongful death, or property
damage resulting from an alleged act of malpractice or negligence by a licensed person.”).
161. CAL CIV. PROC. CODE 340.1(h)(1) and (2) (2005) (requires that a plaintiff seeking to
recover damages stemming from sexual abuse as a child must first obtain certification from (1) his
attorney and (2) from a licensed mental health practitioner.); see also 340.1(h)(2) (the licensed
mental health provider cannot be a party to the litigation and must certify that there is a “reasonable”
basis for the action).
162. Nevada employed a medical malpractice-screening panel to review these cases, though
the procedural requirement that a plaintiff receive such certification has been abandoned.
163. Parness & Leonetti, supra note 149, at 561 (“In the Virgin Islands there is a Medical
Malpractice Action Review Committee that, within the Office of the Commissioner of Health,
arranges for the review of all prospective malpractice claims by experts before civil actions may be
commenced.”).
164. See H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996).
165. See supra notes 144–46 for a summary of the ethical rules that constrain lawyers not to
entertain or introduce frivolous matters.
166. MURRAY SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION: CASES AND MATERIALS,
118 (Michie Publishers 1985).
167. See supra notes 144–46.
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that are frivolous or “not worth notice.” Plaintiff attorneys retained on a
contingency fee arrangement receive compensation only if they achieve
certain results for their clients.168 Because their compensation is directly
tied to success, these attorneys will not file claims unworthy of notice.169
Additionally, lawyers charging an hourly rate are generally concerned
about their reputation. In this way, the engagement of a lawyer on a case
is an existing check on frivolous suits. In light of existing deterrents, it is
valid to wonder whether frivolous suits present the significant problem
that some persons contend they do.
1. The certification requirement may reduce more than frivolous
litigation.
As stated earlier, imposing a certification of merit requirement will
reduce litigation, 170 by imposing another procedural hurdle that must be
cleared before claims can be filed. However, certification requirements
affect a broader range of claims than many proponents of the measures
acknowledge.
Adopting these certification requirements will preclude meritorious
suits as well as frivolous ones. As “parties make litigation [] decisions
based on the procedural setting, and not just on the merits, of a given
case,”171 imposing additional procedural prerequisites to filing claims
will inhibit all litigants from bringing their claims. The significant
possibility that this requirement will intrude on the ability and tendency
of individuals with meritorious claims to assert their rights is something
that should be carefully considered before states rush to adopt the
certification of merits requirements.172

168. Many plaintiff attorneys are compensated on a contingency fee basis, meaning they are
compensated only if they achieve certain results for their clients. If the case is “not worth notice,” it
does not present a viable opportunity for victory or success. Lawyers are not likely to accept such
representation or take such cases to court because they are unlikely to be paid for their efforts. For a
discussion on the risks associated with contingency fee arrangements see e.g., Edell & Assocs. P.C.
v. Law Offices of Peter G. Angelos, 264 F.3d 424 (4th Cir. 2001).
169. If the attorney believes that the claim is not worth notice, and the matter is contingent
upon certain results, he or she will not invest time in that matter.
170. See Molot, supra note 43, at 60 (“In particular, lawyers and clients alike understand that
the cost of litigation may affect outcomes.”).
171. Id.
172. See e.g., Parness & Leonetti, supra note 149, at 578. (“Reform efforts must aim to deter
frivolous claims without denying justice for claims with merit.”).
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2. The certification requirements raise poignant Constitutional
questions.
Certification requirements have already been challenged on various
constitutional grounds. These challenges have been framed in terms of
separation of powers, equal protection, and the right to apply to courts
for a redress of grievances.173
By imposing certification requirements on litigants, the legislature
assumes the power of the judiciary, which, according to constitutional
principles, has authority over “practice and procedure” before its
tribunals.174 Because a special certificate requirement usurped the
constitutional right of the court to set its own pleading rules, the Ohio
Supreme Court held a certification requirement to be invalid.175 Upon
review of a similar statute, the Illinois Supreme Court reached the same
result, invalidating the legislatively imposed certification requirement.176
These precedents demonstrate the judiciary’s concern that certificate of
merit requirements step beyond the scope of legislative authority and into
the realm of judicial operations.177
Certification requirements are also challenged as inconsistent with
the principle of equal protection “since certificate of merit standards treat
differently malpractice, product liability, or other specified claimants
from all other claimants.”178 Certification requirements may implicate
equal protection concerns by providing protections to certain defendants
(i.e. negligent doctors) that are not provided to the public at large (i.e.

173. See e.g., ILL. CONST. art. I, § 5. The right for a redress of grievances is also known as the
right of a litigant to access courts.
174. See e.g., OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) (2006).
175. See Hiatt v. S. Health Facilities, 626 N.E.2d 71 (Ohio 1994) (The pertinent certificate
requirement was found to be inconsistent with a pleading rule set by the Ohio Supreme Court
whereby pleadings” need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit except when otherwise
specified by the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court.”).
176. See DeLuna v. St. Elizabeth’s Hosp., 588 N.E.2d 1139, 1147 (Ill. 1992) (In addition to
finding that the statutory provision unconstitutionally infringed on the judicial branches right to
determine pleadings rules, there was some concern that experts were being forced to perform a
judicial function—assessing the merits of a particular claim—though not trained to do so. The
majority disregarded that contention finding that the expert was not asked to render views
concerning the outcome of the suit, which apparently would have been unconstitutional. Though it
has been rejected, that contention is also one for consideration.).
177. It should also be noted that certification requirements have withstood similar
constitutional assaults in other states. See e.g., Royle v. Fla. Hosp.-E. Orlando, 679 So.2d 1209 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (held that a certification requirement did not violate state constitutional right of
access to courts); Mahoney v. Doerhoff Surgical Servs., 807 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Mo. 1991) (holding
that the certification requirement did not violate jury trial or access to court challenges.).
178. Parness & Leonetii, supra note 149, at 581–82. Consistent with these requirements, a
medical malpractice claimant may be forced to comply with a procedural requirement that an
ordinary tort claimant does not have to worry about.
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negligent drivers). This concern about unequal treatment is best
illustrated by a hypothetical example.
In both instances, assume that the claims arose in the State of Florida
where an applicable statute requires persons claiming damages for
medical malpractice to obtain a written expert opinion certifying that the
cause of action is meritorious.179 Plaintiff A suffers nonpermanent
injuries, valued at $100,000, due to a doctor’s malpractice. Conversely,
Plaintiff B suffers nonpermanent injuries, valued at $100,000 when
involved in an accident with a negligent driver. Further suppose that in
both cases the relative defendants are 100 percent liable for the injuries.
For all intents and purposes, the injuries sustained by Plaintiff A and by
Plaintiff B are the same. Yet, the law imposes an additional burden and
expense on Plaintiff A, who due to the certification statute must allocate
time and money180 to obtain an expert certification before bringing the
claim.
VI. CONCLUSION
As this Article demonstrates, proposals to reduce litigation and
alleviate the consequences of increasing litigation abound. Many of these
proposals would reduce litigation. But, none of them can be implemented
without substantial consequences. Application of the British fee-shifting
model could reduce litigation, but not without limiting access to courts
and rendering the rights of wealthy persons and entities better protected
than those of persons and entities without such resources. Damage caps
could reduce the ills associated with increasing litigation, but not without
usurping judicial power and imposing unjust results in individual cases.
Rigid restrictions on lawyer advertising cannot reduce litigation without
intruding on the First Amendment.
Thus, the judicial system finds itself stuck in a quagmire. On one
hand there appears to be a growing interest in reducing litigation to
protect American industries. 181 On the other hand, the judicial system
remains interested in protecting the rights of individuals and promoting
access to courts. Serious consequences accompany each reform proposal.
So what does all of this mean?
179. In fact, Florida does have such a provision.
180. See e.g., Michael Higgins, Running for Coverage: Hearing “No” for an Answer Does not
Have to be the Final Word when an Insurance Company Denies a Client’s Claim, A.B.A. J., Oct.
1997, at 62. (noting that “expert fees may run from $150 to $400 an hour.”). It should also be noted
that doctors in some states are able to charge upwards of $2000 an hour for expert fees. Accordingly,
the costs of reviewing a case and then issuing a certification of merit can be significantly costly.
181. Pressure to reduce litigation and control the litigation explosion is building in many
social circles.
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America’s unique judicial system stresses the importance of
individual liberty and freedom. Yet a system that provides such freedom
depends on a moral, and self-governing populace. Lawyers, as
representatives of the judicial branch, have a unique responsibility to
counsel their clients and administer the law with adequate regard for
broad societal consequences. The best way to prevent litigation from
unduly overwhelming society is to impress upon the minds of lawyers
their positions as representatives of the judicial branch and
representatives of the society served they serve.
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